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1. INTRODUCTION
Two small gene molecules may give rise to the end of the patenting
process as we know it today. The BRCA1I and BRCA2 (BRCA1I2) genes are a
mutated genetic sequence thought to indicate the predisposition for hereditary
breast and/or ovarian cancer.' To date, the United States Patent and Trademark
I See Detailed Guide: Breast Cancer: Do We Know What Causes Breast Cancer?, Am.
CANCER SoC'v (Sept. 18, 2009),
http://ww2.cancer.org/docroot/CRI/content/CRI 2_4_2XDo-we-know-what-causes-breast-can
cer_5.asp.
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Office (USPTO) has issued patents covering twenty percent of genes which
have been isolated and purified from their natural state found in the human
body.2 The issuance of gene patents has long been a hot-button issue both legal-
ly and ethically around the world, but it was a shock when the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) appeared with an unprecedented move in patent law:
it raised a First Amendment violation of non-patent holder rights of researchers,
doctors, and patients.
Currently, the fate of gene patents-and potentially all patents-rests in
the hands of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4 This
fate was improperly before the United States District Court Southern District of
New York because of a misunderstanding of standing. This case Comment spe-
cifically reviews the first district court opinion in Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology
v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office5 involving the authority to have judicial
review over the USPTO and of the BRCA1/2 gene patent holder, Myriad Genet-
ics (Myriad).
Part II of this case Comment provides background information intended
to help the reader learn about genes and gene patents, the parties involved in the
litigation, the events leading up to the litigation, and finally the district court's
opinion which held that the plaintiffs satisfy the standing requirements against
both the USPTO and Myriad. Part III of this Comment reviews the district
court's opinion. First, Part A analyzes the opinion regarding the USPTO. The
court failed to distinguish reviewability from constitutional standing. Further,
the plaintiffs were unable to establish an injury, prudential standing, and redres-
sability. The only requirement that was possibly established by the plaintiffs
was traceability; however, the same could apply to all plaintiffs challenging any
patent. Finally, Part A closes with a discussion about how this decision affects
gene patents, the patenting process, and the potential consequences to intellec-
tual property. Part B analyzes the district court's opinion regarding Myriad.
The court used a new standard provided by the Supreme Court and interpreted
by the federal courts to support a declaratory judgment action. Despite the dis-
trict court's analysis, the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the requirements for an
"actual controversy."6 Further, most of the plaintiffs do not qualify under the
new standard set forth by the Supreme Court. Part B closes by illustrating how
2 See Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: PubPat and ACLU Aim to Take Down Gene Pa-
tents, THE PRIOR ART (May 14, 2009, 2:09 PM),
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_priorart/2009/05/association-for-molecular-pathology-v-
uspto.html#more.
3 See ACLU Challenges Patents On Breast Cancer Genes: BRCA, ACLU (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/free-speech-womens-rights/aclu-challenges-patents-breast-cancer-genes-0.
4 See Brief for Appellants, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Of-
fice, No. 2010-1406, 2010 WL 4600106 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2010).
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
6 See infra note 215.
[Vol. 1131034
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the district court's broadening availability of declaratory judgment actions will
diminish patent incentives and potentially destroy the patenting process. Final-
ly, Part III recommends the legislative process as the appropriate method
through which a system-wide change should be obtained.
II. A MACROSCOPIC OVERVIEW
In scientific terms, a macroscopic view is defined as a view "large
enough to be observed by the naked eye." 7 While deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
and genes are just small molecules, they have become a large issue both legally
and ethically in the public's eyes. Despite the numerous issues within this case,
this overview will highlight intellectual property concepts and standing issues to
be analyzed throughout this Comment. First, Part A describes the biological
process of genetics. It is essential to know the biological make-up of the
BRCA 1/2 gene because different parts of the gene may affect what biotechnolo-
gy is considered patentable subject matter. Next, Part B provides a brief sum-
mary describing the roles of the parties involved and their purpose for being
joined in this litigation. Part C outlines the key events triggering the alleged
First Amendment violation. Finally, Part D recapitulates the district court's
opinion of the standing elements for two different scenarios. The court analyzed
constitutional standing requirements in order to bring the USPTO to federal
court and it analyzed the "MedImmune standard"'8 in order to support a declara-
tory judgment action against Myriad.
A. DNA 101
Understanding the DNA process, genes, and the patented gene test is
critical to understanding this dispute. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a
double-stranded molecule, which looks like a spiral staircase, located in the nuc-
lei of all biological cells.9 The sides of the staircase are made of sugar-
phosphates.' 0 Each step of the staircase has a left and a right side called a
base.' 1 Each base is a complex molecule termed adenine (A), thymine (T), gua-
nine (G), or cytosine (C).12 Certain pairings are required to connect the left and
Macroscopic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/macroscopic
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
9 See Lotta Fredholm, The Discovery of the Molecular Structure ofDNA - The Double Helix,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Sept. 30, 2003),
http://nobelprize.org/educationalgames/medicine/dnadoublehelix/readmore.htmil.
10 Id.
" Id.
12 Id.
2011] 1035
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right bases to form the step.13 The pairings require A to form with T and require
G to form with C for the DNA to function properly.14
"A gene is a stretch of DNA that codes for a protein. To encode a pro-
tein the gene is divided into groups of three bases." 5 These groups of three
bases, called codons, provide genetic instructions for a two step process-
transcription and translation-which produces an amino acid. 6  A series of
amino acids create a protein.17 This process can be analogized to building a
wooden toy train. The instruction pamphlet to build the toy train is the gene.
Each instruction step builds one boxcar of the train. Similarly, the codon is an
instruction step to build one amino acid. Once several boxcars are made, they
connect together to form the toy train. The toy train is the protein.
BRCAI/2 is the given name for a set of genes that are present in every
human.' 8  The BRCA1/2 genes, when activated, create a protein using the
process above.'9 This resulting protein is used to repair damaged DNA.20
Health risks occur when the BRCAl/2 genes mutate.2' Most of these mutations
lead to an abnormally shortened version of the protein when the protein is
created. 2 2 Some mutations can prevent the protein from being created entirely.23
Various mutations can even delete other BRCAl/2 gene segments from the
DNA. 24 "Researchers believe that a defective or missing BRCAl protein [pre-
vents the] repair [of] damaged DNA or . .. mutations that occur in other genes.
As these defects accumulate, they can allow cells to grow and divide uncontroll-
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AGE: 2008 CASE AND STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT 528 (Aspen Publishers
2008).
16 See id. at 529.
17 Id
18 See Definition of BRCAl, MEDICINENET.COM,
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey-2522 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. The National Cancer Institute defines gene mutation as
[a]ny change in the DNA of a cell. Mutations may be caused by mistakes dur-
ing cell division, or they may be caused by exposure to DNA-damaging
agents in the environment. Mutations can be harmful, beneficial, or have no
effect. If they occur in cells that make eggs or sperm, they can be inherited; if
mutations occur in other types of cells, they are not inherited. Certain muta-
tions may lead to cancer or other diseases.
Definition of Mutation, NAT'L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/dictionary?cdrid=46063
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
22 See Definition ofBRCA I, supra note 18.
23 See BRCA1, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/gene=brcal (last visited
Mar. 7, 2011).
24 Id
[Vol. 1 131036
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ably and form a tumor."25 The BRCAl/2 gene has been identified in tumors
found in breast tissue and the ovaries.2 6 Therefore, by evaluating the presence
of a mutated BRCA1/2 gene, a medical professional can assess an increased risk
for breast and ovarian cancer.
Myriad, the patentee and one of the defendants, has created two medical
tests for patients: "the Comprehensive BRACAnalysis Test and the BRACAna-
lysis Rearrangement Test ('BART'). The Comprehensive BRACAnalysis Test
costs over $3000; BART costs approximately $600, but Myriad will offer
BART testing for free to some women who meet certain criteria."27 These tests
calculate the patient's genetic predisposition to breast cancer by extracting and
purifying DNA from the patient's blood or mouth-swab samples.28 The isolated
DNA sample is then compared to Myriad's patented BRCA1/2 gene, which is
the standard mutated BRCAl/2 gene in isolated form.29 Using its patented me-
thods, Myriad's computer-based software reviews the comparisons to find ab-
normalities or deletions in the DNA sample. BART is highly recommended for
those patients with a strong family history of breast or ovarian cancer; it is esti-
mated that one percent of patients will have a mutation detected by the test.3 0
Subsequently, if a patient receives a positive match for the mutated BRCAl/2
gene, the patient may choose how to act next. For example, the patient can un-
dergo a bilateral mastectomy (the removal of all breast tissue), bilateral oopho-
rectomy (the removal of ovaries), or can increase the frequency of preventative
screenings and act promptly at the first signs of cancer.3 ' However, BRCA 1/2 is
not the only gene known to be correlated with breast cancer;32 therefore, My-
riad's analysis may not be a conclusive indication of a patient's potential risk.
Presently, Myriad is the only company offering this testing analysis on
the BRCA1/2 gene because it is the only company with exclusive patent rights
to do so. Consequently, the following legal action has ensued.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
380 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
28 MYRIAD GENETIC LABORATORIES, INC., BRACANALYSIS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (Feb.
2009), available at http://www.myriadtests.com/provider/doc/BRACAnalysis-Technical-
Specifications.pdf.
29 Id.
30 See Mary Beattie, Updated Test Improves Detection for Breast and Ovarian Cancer Gene,
UCSF MED. CENTER (June 2008),
http://www.ucsfhealth.org/newsletters/primarycareconnections/june_2008/cancergenes/.
3 See BRCAl and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA#11 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
32 See generally Mutated Genes and Abnormal Protein Expression, CANCER GENETICS WEB,
http://www.cancerindex.org/geneweb/XO401.htm#genes (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
2011] 1037
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B. Facts: Who's in the Gene Pool?
At the heart of this action are seven patents issued by the USPTO." In
order to obtain a patent in the United States, a patent applicant must show to the
USPTO a useful, new, and nonobvious discovery.34 To be usefil, the applicant
must be able to specifically detail how the item works and that it is beneficial to
the public rather than only helpful for further research.35 To be new, the discov-
ery could not exist prior to the filing of the application (also known as prior art),
and could not be currently known or used by others.36 To be nonobvious, a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) must believe the discovery is not
obvious to try, conceive, combine, reduce to practice, or result from prior art.
38Finally, the invention or discovery must be of patentable subject matter. A
patent applicant cannot attempt to patent laws of nature, physical phenomena, or
abstract ideas.39 Although genes are found in nature, common law established
that a gene is patentable subject matter only if the gene has been "isolated and
purified" from its natural state.40 Once the patent is issued, the patent owner has
exclusive rights over the patented discovery for seventeen years from the date of
filing if filed before June 8, 1995 or twenty years if filed after.4 1
The patents at issue cover the isolated unaffected BRCA 1/2 genes, some
isolated mutated BRCA1/2 genes, methods for comparing patient BRCA1/2
genes with the isolated unaffected and mutated BRCAl/2 genes, and a method
for examining the growth of cells containing the BRCAl/2 genes.42
The driving force behind this matter is the ACLU; it named the Asso-
ciation for Molecular Pathology (AMP) as the lead plaintiff among other large
3 See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995), U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492
(filed April 29, 1996), U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995), U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999
(filed June 7, 1995), U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995), U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441
(filed June 5, 1996), & U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed Mar. 20, 1998), available at
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat [hereinafter Myriad's patents].
34 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); See also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing the patent invalid because the tools were used to search for practical utility and no other use
was specifically defined or for the benefit of the public to satisfy the utility requirement).
36 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (g) (2006).
3 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
3 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas as unpatentable subject matter).
39 35 U.S.C. § 101.
4 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 109 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Changes to Implement 20-
Year Patent Term and Provisional Applications, 60 Fed. Reg. 20195 (Apr. 25, 1995), 1174 Off.
Gaz. Pat. Office 15 (May 2, 1995) (final rule).
42 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
380 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
1038 [Vol. 113
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organizations43 wanting to perform research and clinical practice involving the
BRCAl/2 genes if the Myriad patents are invalidated. Additionally, several
doctors and professors," non-medical organizations, and women diagnosed with
breast cancer are also plaintiffs named in the complaint. 45 The plaintiffs argue
that the established policy permitting gene patents is unconstitutional because it
violates First Amendment rights.46 Therefore, the plaintiffs brought this joint
action against the USPTO for abiding by the established policy and issuing a
gene patent, and against Myriad for enforcing its exclusive rights authorized by
the issued gene patent.4 7
The first defendant in this matter is the USPTO. The USPTO is a gov-
ernment agency under the Commerce Department of the United States.4 8 The
USPTO's defendant status in this matter is seemingly for the sole purpose of
creating a constitutional argument in order for the ACLU to obtain standing.49
Myriad Genetics 50 is a for-profit corporation recognized for its world-
wide leadership in the molecular diagnostic field.5' Prior to the formation of
Myriad, several research teams looked into the possibility of the correlation
between genetics and an increased risk of cancer.52 One of these research teams,
eventually associated with Myriad, isolated the precise gene thought to be re-
lated to breast cancer susceptibility and named it BRCAl.5 Once this gene was
discovered and its precise structure determined, the researchers explored for
additional relevant genes and subsequently found BRCA2.54
Presently, Myriad has ownership or exclusive license in both Europe
and the United States for the human version of and methods relating to the
BRCAl/2 genes. The European Patent Office (EPO) granted Myriad four pa-
43 These organizations include the American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG), the Amer-
ican Society for Clinical Pathology (ASCP), and the College of American Pathologists (CAP)
[hereinafter the plaintiffs]. See Complaint at 3-5, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
4 Robert Hubbard, Ph.D., Jeffrey Kant, M.D, Ph.D., Haig Kazazian, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Kazazian),
Wendy Chung, M.D., Ph.D., Harry Ostrer, M.D. (Dr. Ostrer), David Ledbetter, Ph.D., Stephen T.
Warren, Ph.D., Ellen Matloff, M.S., and Elsa W. Reich, M.S. [hereinafter the plaintiffs]. Id. at 5-
13.
45 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
374-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
46 Id. at 369-70.
47 Id. at 380-81.
48 Id. at 376.
49 id.
50 See generally MYRIAD, http://www.myriad.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
51 Id
52 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
5 Id
54 Id
2011] 1039
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tents on the BRCA1/2 genes. 5 These patents cover "all methods of diagnosis
(EP0699754), specific mutations (EP0705903), and diagnostic kits (EP0705902
and EP0785216)."'5 Myriad obtained exclusive rights over diagnostic breast
and ovarian cancer testing using these genes in all European countries because
of its patents' broad claim construction. 5 7 The United States patents were first
filed in 1995 and 1996, which means Myriad's exclusive rights over the pa-
tented items will expire in about five years.s
C. Sequence ofEvents
Based on declarations made by the plaintiffs, the district court found the
following. In the late 1990s, Dr. Kazazian, while working at the University of
Pennsylvania, provided BRCAl genetic testing services to women. 59 In May of
1998, Myriad sent Dr. Kazazian and the university an offer to buy a license al-
lowing them to continue commercial work, but neither responded to the offer.o
In August of 1998, Myriad sent Dr. Kazazian and his assistants a cease-and-
desist letter warning that his commercial testing was infringing upon Myriad's
patents. 6 1 About a year later, Myriad sent another letter reiterating the warning
to counsel from the university and the counsel requested Dr. Kazazian to stop
his activities shortly thereafter.6 2 At that time, Dr. Kazazian discontinued his
BRCAl screening tests. 3 Around the same time, Dr. Ostrer provided patient
samples to Dr. Kazazian for screening and received a cease-and-desist letter.6
Dr. Ostrer's letter contained an offer for a license which he declined. Yale
DNA Diagnostics Laboratory (YDL) performed BRCAl/2 genetic testing and
received a cease-and-desist letter. 6 Later, a director from YDL called Myriad
to see if certain testing would infringe to which Myriad responded in the affir-
ss Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer
Testing and the Inherent Implications for US. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the
Myriad Genetics' BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 136 (2004).
56 Id.
57 Id
58 See generally Myriad's patents, supra note 33; see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
supra note 41.
s9 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
378 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 378-79.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
6 Id. at 379.
1040 [Vol. 113
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mative.6 7 In 1997-1998, Myriad brought Oncormed, a company offering com-
peting BRCA1/2 genetic testing, to court for an alleged infringement; however,
the case ended in a settlement. 8 In the midst of protecting its patents from
commercial infringement, Myriad sent a letter to the National Cancer Institute
(NCI) to reassure NCI that it would not take any legal action for research on the
patented discoveries.69
Approximately ten years later, on May 12, 2009, the ACLU filed its
complaint on behalf of the plaintiffs in the Southern District Court of New York
(S.D.N.Y.).o The complaint alleged that the defendants' BRCAl/2 gene pa-
tents were unconstitutional and invalid.71  The complaint created four types of
categories and divided each patent and its corresponding claims into those cate-
gories.7 2 The plaintiffs argued that these claims should be invalidated because
they violate Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, the
First Amendment,74 the Fourteenth Amendment, and 35 U.S.C. § 10176 on the
67 Id.
68 Id
69 Id.
70 Id. at 379-80.
n Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
72 Id. at 380.
[Category One:] claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the '282 patent and claim 1 of the
'492 patent, cover isolated, non-mutated forms of BRCA1 and BRCA2 as well
as fragments of BRCAJ of 15 nucleotides or more. [Category Two:] claim 1
of the '473 patent, claim 7 of the '282 patent and claims 6 and 7 of the '492 pa-
tent, cover isolated forms of BRCAl and BRCA2 that contain mutations that
may or may not have any correlation with an increased risk of breast and ova-
rian cancer. [Category Three:] claim I of the '999 patent, covers any method
of analyzing an individual's BRCAJ gene to determine whether the individu-
al's gene contains an inherited mutation. [Category Four:] claim 1 of the '001
patent, claim I of the '441 patent, and claims I and 2 of the '857 patent, covers
comparison of a patients' BRCAl and BRCA2 gene sequences with the normal
BRCA 1 and BRCA2 gene sequences to determine whether there are differenc-
es that would indicate a genetic predisposition to breast cancer. Claim 20 of
the '282 patent, which the Plaintiffs include in this fourth category of claims,
covers a method of examining the growth of cells containing a mutated form
of BRCAJ following their treatment with a potential therapeutic compound.
Id.
7 "Congress shall have the power .. . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT.
amend. I.
75 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2011] 1041
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basis that the BRCAl/2 genes are "products of nature, laws of nature, and/or
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic human knowledge or thought."n
The plaintiffs' request for relief asked the court to declare the patents invalid
and/or unenforceable and to enjoin the defendants from enforcing its patent
holder's rights. On July 13, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing pursuant to the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2), and failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
On August 26, 2009, the plaintiffs made a motion for summary judg-
ment to argue that the case did not turn on factual findings but on legal ques-
tions regarding the ability to patent genes.so On November 2, 2009, Judge Ro-
bert W. Sweet issued the court's opinion, denying all motions to dismiss for
each of the defendants.8 ' Quickly, patent attorneys and science gurus every-
where began feverishly blogging about the revival of the great policy debate:
Can and should genes be patented?
After the issued opinion, the defendants continued their struggle to get
out of court. On December 23, 2009, Myriad submitted its own motion for
summary judgment and, on December 24, 2009, USPTO followed suit with its
own motion for summary judgment.82 On February 2, 2010, oral arguments
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
76 "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
n Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
380 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
78 See generally Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
79 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
80 See generally Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365.
81 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
82 See John Conley, Myriad Genetics, USPTO File Summary Judgment Motions in Gene Pa-
tent Case, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/01/13/myriad-genetics-uspto-file-summary-
judgment-motions-in-gene-patent-case/.
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were made to the court.83 Judge Sweet's final order came down on March 29,
2010, finding in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring gene patents invalid.84 Pre-
sently, the bloggers, patent attorneys, scientists, and researchers await the re-
sponse of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Once the November 2, 2009 opinion on standing was released, the dis-
trict court continued with the matter and ruled that the patents were invalid and
issued prospective orders to the USPTO regarding the issuance of future genetic
patents. The rest of this Comment will summarize, analyze, and critique the
opinion on standing because without this determination the substantive issues
would not have been reviewed.
D. The Court's Conclusive Results
The court broke the standing question into two sections. The court first
evaluated standing to bring the USPTO to federal court for constitutional viola-
tions and then the standing to have a declaratory judgment action on Myriad's
patents.8 ' This section will summarize the court's argument as to how the plain-
tiffs obtained standing to reach each of the defendants.
1. Standing Against USPTO Tests Positive
The district court began by outlining the requirements for constitutional
standing and prudential standing. Summarizing the rule from Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc. the court wrote:
Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to
show (1) that he personally has suffered some actual or threat-
ened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant, that (2) the injury fairly can be traced to the chal-
lenged action, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.
8 See Judge Hears Arguments in Challenge to Patents on Genes Tied to Breast, Ovarian
Cancer, MED. NEWS TODAY (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/178289.php.
8 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
85 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
383-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
86 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
87 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384 (quoting Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (internal
citations omitted)).
2011] 1043
11
Maxey: A Myriad of Misunderstanding Standing: Decoding Judicial Review f
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Additionally, the court addressed the prudential requirements, which must be
satisfied beyond the constitutional requirements. It stated:
[T]he judiciary should "avoid deciding questions of broad social
import where no individual rights would be vindicated." Pru-
dential standing requires, inter alia, that a party "assert his own
legal interests rather than those of third parties," and that a
claim must not be a "generalized grievance" shared in by all or
a large class of citizens. Prudential standing also addresses
whether "the constitutional or statutory provision on which [a
plaintiffs] claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiffs position a right to judicial relief."
Thus, the litigant's complaint must fall within the "zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitu-
tional guarantee in question."88
First, the court reused an earlier section of its opinion in favor of subject
matter jurisdiction in order to satisfy the injury requirement. In this section, the
court stated, "[The USPTO] cites to no comparable statutory scheme providing
a remedy for persons who complain about the constitutionality of patents is-
sued by the USPTO and/or the policies and practices of the USPTO."89 For this
reason alone, the court determined that the plaintiffs should have standing to
allege a constitutional claim if there is no other remedy provided. 90 And, al-
though the court does not specifically address the issue, the opinion seems to
conclude that this lack of remedy is the injury the plaintiffs sought to redress.
Second, the court agreed with the USPTO that "Myriad's refusal to li-
cense its patent broadly contributes to [p]laintiffs' alleged injuries."91 However,
the court continued the analysis and stated that "the patents were issued by the
USPTO, in accordance with its policies and practices. It is those policies and
practices that the [p]laintiffs allege are unconstitutional. The injury alleged is
therefore 'fairly traceable' to the USPTO."92
Finally, the court analyzed the redressability requirement and concluded
that the injuries would be redressed if the court "declare[s] unconstitutional the
USPTO's policies and practices with respect to the challenged claims and simi-
lar classes of claims ... [it] would serve to render the claims-at-issue definition-
ally invalid."9 3 The court further reasoned that "[a]s a result, the [p]laintiffs
8 Id. (internal citations omitted).
89 Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 384-85.
91 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
92 Id
93 Id
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would be allowed to engage in conduct currently prohibited by Myriad's pa-
tents."94
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the
USPTO.
2. Standing Against Myriad Tests Positive
In the standing section of the opinion, the district court acknowledged
that this was a declaratory judgment action between the plaintiffs and Myriad
and stated that the purpose "is to provide the allegedly infringing party relief
from uncertainty and delay regarding its legal rights."9 6 Therefore, there are
different requirements set forth to determine standing. The Declaratory Judg-
ment Act7 requires a constitutional case or controversy in order to have stand-
ing in a federal court.98 However, the court rested heavily on a recent case,99
which provided that declaratory judgment cases involving patents must be ex-
amined with regard to "all the circumstances." 00 Under this approach, the court
stated that "'the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between the parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment."' 10 Unsure of the "all circumstances"
boundaries, the court determined there was enough guidance provided by feder-
al courts to declare a two part test: there must be some "affirmative act" taken
by the patent holder to enforce the patent and there must be "meaningful prepa-
ration" to infringe the patent by the plaintiffs.1 02
First, the court found that the defendants had taken affirmative acts to
enforce their patent rights.10 3 The court arrived at this conclusion by referencing
the cease-and-desist letters to Dr. Kazazian, the University of Pennsylvania, Dr.
94 Id
9 Id.
9 Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
9 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
9 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
9 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (holding a licensee had standing
for a declaratory judgment action even though the licensee continued to pay royalty fees and there
was no infringement yet).
100 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
1o1 Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273 (1941)); see also Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
102 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 386-87.
103 Id. at 387-90.
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Ostrer, and YDL, as well as the lawsuit against Oncormed.'0 The court deter-
mined that the combined weight of all the previous actions was enough to give
the presumption that the defendants would take action to enforce its patent
rights, despite the fact that the action was not taken against all of the named
plaintiffs and the attempted infringement action had been against a party outside
of the action.' 05
Second, the court found that the plaintiffs had taken meaningful prepa-
ration to infringe the patent.'06 After reviewing the plaintiffs' declarations, the
court found:
The [p]laintiffs have demonstrated that the researcher
[p]laintiffs are poised to begin BRCAl/2 testing and that the pa-
tents-in-suit present the only obstruction to doing so. Moreo-
ver, Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer had previously en-
gaged in BRCAl/2 testing prior to Myriad's assertion of its pa-
tent rights against them. Consequently, the researcher
[p]laintiffs are meaningfully prepared to begin 'BRCA testing
to advance research and/or to offer . . . an important service to
the public' and 'could do so within a matter of weeks.' Plain-
tiffs' affidavits similarly establish that members of the various
medical organizations, represented by the organizations under
the 'doctrine of associational standing,' are, like the researcher
[p]laintiffs, also meaningfully prepared and possess the desire
to engage in BRCA1/2 testing were the patents-in-suit invali-
dated. o
The court also addressed potential contributory infringers who are named plain-
tiffs by stating:
[T]he non-researcher [p]laintiffs, may very well understand the
precise nature of, and be prepared to take advantage of, the ser-
vices of a potential infringer were the latter not prevented from
offering those services by a third party's assertion of its patent
rights. Here, it is alleged that the researcher [p]laintiffs would
offer infringing BRCA1/2 genetic testing services of the type the
non-researcher [p]laintiffs would solicit or encourage others to
solicit. 0
104 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
387-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
105 Id.
'0 Id. at 390-92.
107 Id. at 391-92 (internal citations omitted).
los Id. at 392.
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Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied the "all circumstances"
test in order to establish declaratory judgment standing.'09
III. WHERE Do WE STAND ON STANDING?
Part III of this Comment will provide an analysis of why the district
court should have decided the standing issue differently. By analyzing
precedent and reviewing the court's application of the law, Part III will review
the standing requirements against the USPTO and then the declaratory judgment
standing requirements against Myriad.
A. Standing Up for USPTO
Like the district court, this section begins with the conditions required
for the plaintiffs to have standing against the USPTO. First, the court misused
the reviewability requirement in order to establish an injury. Therefore, this
Comment analyzes the reviewability requirement separately from the standing
requirements. Next, the Comment guides the reader through each hurdle re-
quired to establish standing in a federal court when applying a First Amendment
violation claim. The hurdles demand that plaintiffs establish injury, prudential
standing, traceability, and redressability.
1. Reviewing Reviewability
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides a presumption of
judicial review if the agency has made a final decision or there is no other reme-
dy in court, unless the agency's statute precludes judicial review or the agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law.' 10 Currently, one opportunity
for a third party to claim a patent's invalidity is by using invalidation as a de-
fense in federal court against an infringement charge."' Additionally, a third
party can ask the USPTO for inter partes reexamination.1 2 An inter partes
reexamination requests the USPTO to reexamine the patent under the provisions
of 35 U.S.C. § 301.11 Finally, the third party can petition the USPTO for an ex
parte reexamination."14 Once the petition is filed, the director may determine if
there is a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the
patent.' 's The plaintiffs did not use invalidation as a defense prior to bringing
109 Id. at 390-92.
110 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
U' 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
112 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).
113 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-312 (2006).
114 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
115 Id.
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the USPTO to court, did not request an inter partes reexamination to consider
the possibilities of prior art for the BRCAl/2 gene, and did not petition for an ex
parte reexamination allowing the director to determine a substantial new ques-
tion. Therefore, the plaintiffs appear to be precluded from having the presump-
tion of judicial review for not exhausting all administrative remedies." 6
However, the court decided that these remedial schemes actually pre-
vented the plaintiffs from raising the First Amendment argument and no other
avenue was available to review this particular issue.' 17 Although the Supreme
Court has not decided whether Congress may preclude judicial review of consti-
tutional challenges,"' 8 the Supreme Court has determined that unless Congress is
clear, constitutional claims can be reviewed."' 9 Throughout the patent statutes,
Congress did not clearly state whether constitutional claims could be re-
viewed.120 Therefore, it is possible that the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim
would have a presumption of judicial review.
On the other hand, by reviewing the USPTO's history and patterns,
there is evidence that another remedial scheme is provided to allow the plaintiffs
to bring a First Amendment claim prior to reviewing agency action. The
USPTO has consistently abided by federal court and Supreme Court precedent
to establish examination procedures and to properly issue a valid patent.'' This
remedial scheme would allow the plaintiffs to bring a valid action-like a decla-
ratory judgment action-to attempt to invalidate a patent against the patent
holder. Then, whatever the court holds would determine how the USPTO acts.
Therefore, if the court finds the USPTO policy to be wrong and it violates the
First Amendment, then the USPTO will no longer follow that policy and the
First Amendment would no longer be infringed. Thus, the plaintiffs would be
precluded from reviewing agency action because the plaintiffs did not use this
remedial scheme first.
Nonetheless, reviewability under the APA and the requirements to ob-
tain standing are two different hurdles. "[A] plaintiff who brings a statutory
enforcement action under the [APA] must meet its statutory requirements for
116 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
11 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
118 But cf Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 611-15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Congress does have the power to preclude judicial review of circuit courts under the United States
Constitution, Article 3, Section 1).
119 Id at 603 ("We emphasized . .. that where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear." (citations omitted)).
120 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 311-312 (2006).
121 See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm.
[Vol. 1131048
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/11
A MYRIAD OF MISUNDERSTANDING STANDING
standing."l 22 Therefore, a plaintiff must separately illustrate "that there has been
final agency action adversely affecting the plaintiff, and . .. as a result, it suffers
legal wrong or that its injury falls within the 'zone of interests' of the statutory
provision the plaintiff claims was violated." 2 3 For these reasons, the court, al-
though finding a possible presumption of reviewability, failed to distinguish
reviewability and standing. Therefore, the court's opinion insufficiently satis-
fied the requirements for standing discussed below.
2. (Under)Standing
As mentioned by the court, Article III provides three requirements for
standing: injury, traceability, and redressability.12 4 Furthermore, the court ac-
knowledged the prudential standing requirement, which provides an additional
threshold to prevent "generalized grievances."l25 This segment will provide a
critique of the court's reasoning for each of these elements and the outcome at
which the court should have arrived.
a. Injury
Article III requires the plaintiff to show an injury-in-fact, which gener-
ally may be the hardest to establish out of the three standing requirements. The
Supreme Court has explained that the plaintiff "must be able to show not only
that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." 26
Unfortunately, the district court did not provide in its opinion an analysis of the
injury requirement. Instead, the court narrowly focused on the facts in the case
law provided by the USPTO's motion to dismiss and reasoned that an injury
existed.12 7 The complaint brought by the plaintiffs is a First Amendment chal-
lenge, not the complaint of an improper remedial scheme as the court ana-
lyzed.12 8 Had the court properly analyzed the injury requirement, it would have
arrived at the following conclusions.
122 Churchill Cnty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted);
see also Lujan v. Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-883 (1990).
12 Churchill Cnty., 150 F.3d at 1078 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
124 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
125 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
126 Id. at 478 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (emphasis added).
127 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384-85; see also Defendant's Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trade Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
128 See Complaint, supra note 43, at 19-20 (claims 50, 52, and 54).
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First, there is no direct injury. The USPTO patent policies only directly
affect patent applicants because those policies determine whether or not a patent
will be issued. If anything, the plaintiffs have an indirect injury based on
USPTO policies because an issued patent is a consequence of those policies.
Nevertheless, the USPTO policy in question provides that "DNA molecules are
eligible for patents when isolated from their natural state and purified or when
synthesized in a laboratory from chemical starting materials."' 29 This policy
was provided after the courts consistently upheld the validity of gene patents.130
The Utility Examination Guidelines are set forth by the USPTO so examiners
can evaluate pending applications and either reject or deny them.' 3 ' Therefore,
the only parties directly affected are patent applicants who have their applica-
tions approved or denied by this written policy. However, the "written policy"
complained of was not even in effect during the examination period of the pa-
tents in question.132 Thus, the "written policy" could not directly affect these
patents or the patent holders, nor indirectly affect any other third party. 33
Second, the injury claimed is indefinite. The plaintiff must show that he
has suffered some injury "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti-
cal." 3 4 Had the written policy been in effect, the policy would still not infringe
on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The supposed "illegal conduct" oc-
curs if the patent application satisfies the written policy and all other require-
ments under 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and a patent is then issued. "Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive[,] and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
129 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, UTILITY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,
1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter Utility Examination Guidelines].
130 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (holding
compounds isolated from nature are patentable); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1397 (C.C.P.A.
1970) (holding "these compounds do not exist in nature and appellants have not merely discov-
ered nor claimed sufficiently broadly to encompass what was previously in nature"); See also
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("nonnaturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity" as patentable subject matter).
131 See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT EXAMINATION POLICY,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
132 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 129 (stating the effective date for the policy as
Jan. 5, 2001); see also Myriad's patent, supra note 33 (showing the patent validation dates to be as
follows: '282 patent on May 5, 1998, '492 patent on Nov. 17, 1998, '473 patent on Dec. 2, 1997,
'999 patent on Jan. 20, 1998, '001 patent on Jan. 20, 1998, '441 patent on May 19, 1998, and '857
patent on March 7, 2000.).
1 See Complaint, supra note 128 (Claim 50 argues that Myriad obtained its patents from the
USPTO "pursuant to a formal written policy by the Patent Office.").
134 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted).
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media of his choice."' 35 Neither the contested policy, governing statute, Intel-
lectual Property Clause nor the issued patents prohibit the plaintiffs from print-
ing, thinking, speaking, or discussing with others the patented product or the
methods patented.'3 6 In fact, anyone can look up an issued patent or patent ap-
plication and all of the information contained therein through a simple search on
the USPTO's website.1
For example, the Supreme Court has discussed what others can do with
patented subject matter without infringement. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T
Corp., 138 the Court compared a patented software code to a blueprint containing
instructions, where the code is an idea not actually patented until it becomes a
computer-readable hard copy.'3 9  The Court further explained, "[a] blueprint
may contain precise instructions for the construction and combination of the
components of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable component" of
that device.14 0 "Blueprints too, or any design information for that matter, can be
independently developed, bought, and sold."'41 Similarly, the patents and patent
claims are "blueprints" describing the BRCAI/2 gene as well as the methods for
testing patients.14 2 Therefore, the plaintiffs have the capability to use the blue-
print in any way to freely express the information without infringing, as long as
the end product described by the blueprint is not constructed and used.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have the freedom to perform research and
experiments on patented products and also had the opportunity to do both for
commercial purposes.143 Myriad illustrated this freedom by notifying NCI that
it could continue and that Myriad would not interfere with the NCI's research at
all.'" Additionally, Myriad had offered to sell licenses to laboratories so those
labs could continue commercial testing without infringing.14 5 Finally, Myriad
backed up this claim when it offered Dr. Ostrer, Dr. Kazazian, and the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania licenses to use the patented discoveries, but those plaintiffs
13s The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CECC.GOV,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/general/unCivilPolitical.php?modeprint&PHPSESSID=2b043edcff5
e7a9649dbc40e05447e19 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
136 See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
137 See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Search Page, http://patfl.uspto.gov/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011).
'" 550 U.S. 437, 449 (2007) (holding that the abstract part of the software are instructions and
was not a component; therefore, there is no infringement until the next step is taken to render the
components useful).
13 Id. at 449.
140 Id. at 438.
141 Id. at 450-51.
142 See Myriad's patents, supra note 33.
143 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
1" Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
379 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
145 Id.
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either turned down or ignored the offer.14 6 The plaintiffs' freedoms were not
hindered and no actual injury or imminent injury occurred. Third and finally,
the injury is common with people generally. As mentioned earlier, the injury
resulting from the illegal conduct is that a patent is issued, which, arguendo,
infringes the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Specifically, the complaint
went as far as stating that the injury was caused by the "monopoly" that Myriad
held over the genetic testing of BRCAl/2 genes.14 7 Following this logic, every
policy followed by the USPTO that results in an issued patent would violate the
First Amendment rights of any researcher, inventor, innovator, or average Joe
who may have wanted to use the patented product for any of the aforementioned
freedoms of expression, but are unable to do so because of the monopoly pro-
vided to the patent holder. The plaintiffs' real qualm is not truly the freedom to
seek, receive, or impart information; the actual injury is that the plaintiffs do not
wish to pay to practice the patent, a limitation that applies to any patent of any
type. If the plaintiffs' claim was cognizable, patent and copyright protection
would cease to exist.
Standing is not satisfied because it is an "'abstract injury in nonobser-
vance of the Constitution asserted by ... citizens.' Such claims amount to little
more than attempts 'to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air . . .
generalized grievances about the conduct of government."' 1 4 8 Allowing the
plaintiffs to implicitly claim a direct injury on the basis that the monopoly pro-
vided by the issuance of patents inhibits others' First Amendment rights does
not satisfy the standing requirement; rather it serves as a generalized grievance
of the entire patenting process. Consequently, this argument takes us to the next
section: prudential standing.
b. Prudential Standing
Although the district court outlined the rules for prudential standing, it
did not analyze the effect of those rules as applied to this case. Again, the court
narrowly applied the facts from the authority cited by the USPTO and glossed
over the clumsy efforts by the plaintiffs to establish prudential standing.149 pru
dential standing requirements are narrower than the constitutional requirements.
The court can find an injury-in-fact, which is "an invasion of a legally protected
interest."15 0 "[T]he interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be]
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question."15' Further, the protected claim cannot
'4 Id.
147 See Complaint, supra note 43 at 25-26 (claims 84 and 85).
148 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ans. United for the Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982) (citations omitted).
149 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 384-85.
ISO Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
15I Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
1052 [Vol. 113
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/11
A MYRIAD OF MISUNDERSTANDING STANDING
be a "generalized grievance,"15 2 but can be overcome if there is a "chilling ef-
fect" caused by the direct prohibition of First Amendment rights. 5 3 By appro-
priately evaluating the additional requirements for agency review, the court
should have arrived at the conclusions stated below.
To begin, the plaintiffs are not in the zone of interests. There must be a
"legally protected interest,"l5 4 which was violated causing the injury and that
injury must be "'within the meaning of the relevant statute'- i.e., [meet] the
'zone of interests' test. The relevant statute, of course, is the statute whose vi-
olation is the gravamen of the complaint . . . .,"s The legally protected interest
sought is the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Based on causes of action 102
and 103, the plaintiffs try to establish First Amendment rights within the Intel-
lectual Property Clause and 35 U.S.C. § 101 as providing the legally protected
interest. 5 6
The plaintiffs are not in the zone of interests under the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause. Specifically, the Clause states that Congress shall secure "for li-
mited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."'57 The interests sought to be protected by the Fra-
mers are those of the patent holder. Moreover, there is no language that evi-
dences intent for the protection of the public or to elicit First Amendment rights
from patent holders. Previously, the Intellectual Property Clause has been re-
viewed subject to First Amendment analysis, but under the realm of Copyright
Infringement. The Supreme Court held:
The Copyright Clause [also known as the Intellectual Property
Clause] and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This
proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's li-
mited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.
Indeed, copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and pub-
lication of free expression. As Harper & Row observed: "The
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free ex-
pression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas." 58
152 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
153 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
' Defenders of Wildife, 504 U.S. at 560.
'ss Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886 (1990).
156 See Complaint, supra note 43 at 29.
' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
158 Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
2011] 1053
21
Maxey: A Myriad of Misunderstanding Standing: Decoding Judicial Review f
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Since it is the same clause, this same concept would hold true to patent law.
Nonetheless, Congress has provided for a balance between the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause and the First Amendment over time through administrative regula-
tions.
To assist in the dissemination of information, issued patents and patent
applications are published, viewable, and printable.1 59 Further, Congress has not
extended the reach of "exclusive right" to prohibit speech, thought, or the con-
veyance of information provided in issued patents or patent applications. Al-
though Congress has avoided challenges to non-patent holders' First Amend-
ment rights, the Intellectual Property Clause "empowers Congress to determine
the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's judgment, will
serve the ends of the Clause,"16 0 and Congress has yet to change the intended
protected interest of patent holders.
The plaintiffs are not in the zone of interest under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
This statute states, "[w]hoever invents or discovers ... composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, sub-
ject to the conditions and requirements of this title."1 61 Based on the conditions
and requirements of the statute, these plaintiffs are not an intended protected
interest because they were not patent applicants and were an outside party to the
patent application process. Again, there is no express language within this sta-
tute or the rest of the title illustrating the intent for First Amendment rights.162
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has extracted from the conditions and re-
quirements of this statute the patentability of "laws of nature, physical pheno-
mena, and abstract ideas." 6 3 The plaintiffs have relied on this precedent to at-
tach First Amendment rights to the intended protected interest of 35 U.S.C. §
101. Ironically, this same Supreme Court decision also said in discussing the
patentability of genetic research, this subject "should be addressed to the politi-
cal branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the
courts."1 6' Therefore, it would seem that the plaintiffs' interest would not be
protected here.
Finally, the plaintiffs have not been "chilled" in a way that makes their
generalized grievance actionable.16 5 "In recent years this Court has found in a
number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or
'chilling,' effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibi-
' See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
160 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
161 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
162 See generally id.
163 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980).
6 Id. at 317.
165 See generally Complaint, supra note 43 at 25-26 (claims 84 and 85); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982) (cita-
tions omitted).
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tion against the exercise of First Amendment rights."l 6 6 The plaintiffs claim that
(1) there is a chilling effect because the patent holder can enforce its patent and
that enforcement prevents the plaintiffs from establishing new tests; and (2)
there is a chilling effect for researchers for fear of enforcement if they perform
research.16 7  First of all, neither of these "chilling effects" is caused by the
USPTO's "written policy;" rather the claims relate to the Intellectual Property
Clause's and Patent Act's grant of exclusive rights. Moreover, Myriad has al-
lowed for research use, negating any chilling effect and demonstrating that the
proper party is the patentee and not the patent granting agency. 6 8
A chilling effect only exists because of the limited exclusive right the
patent holder has obtained. However, this chilling effect applies to all patents.
This deterrent described by the plaintiffs was an intention of the Intellectual
Property Clause. Previously discussed, the Supreme Court held that the proxim-
ity in adoption of the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment
signifies that the limited exclusive right is attuned with the freedom of expres-
sion.169 By bringing the USPTO into the litigation, the plaintiffs will conti-
nuously have a generalized grievance because any policy the USPTO enforces
results in a patent and this end result is what leads to "a chill factor." This leads
to the absurd result that the USPTO can be sued every time it issues a patent, let
alone an invalid one.
Instead, as discussed above, the USPTO implements federal court deci-
sions and statutes when examining patents.o70 Therefore, there are two ways to
provoke a system-wide change without being faced with a generalized grievance
issue. First, the plaintiffs could directly challenge the validity of the isolated
BRCA1/2 gene claims and the result may change, narrow, or omit entirely the
"isolated and purified" rule. This is what the potential infringers have done by
suing Myriad for declaratory relief. A change by the federal courts would
change the USPTO's examination policy. Alternatively, the plaintiffs could
create a system-wide change through legislation, discussed in Part IV, for which
the courts exhibited their preference in the past concerning biotechnology.' 7'
The court appears to have misinterpreted the injury and prudential
standing requirements. The injury was an indirect and indefinite injury which
could not apply generally. Although there was a generalized grievance, the
plaintiffs failed to overcome this limitation because the plaintiffs were not in the
zone of interests and did not suffer from a chilling effect under the First
Amendment. Nonetheless, the court established that an injury did occur; there-
166 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
167 See Complaint, supra note 43 at 26-27 (claims 88 and 89).
168 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
169 See generally Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
170 See generally the cases cited supra note 130.
"' See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
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fore, the following sections continue evaluating the court's reasoning for tracea-
bility and redressability.
c. Traceability
Another concept required by Article III standing is traceability. Tracea-
bility "examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct
and the alleged injury."l72 The Supreme Court has contradictorily applied this
requirement throughout the years.'7 3 Therefore, the Court could reasonably rule
either way on this point. In this instance, the court found that the plaintiffs'
First Amendment injury was based on the USPTO's written policy, and because
the USPTO follows that written policy a patent is issued;17 4 hence, the injury is
fairly traceable to the USPTO.
The Supreme Court held that to satisfy this element "the injury has to be
'fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." 7 5
At first glance, it appears that the Court is correct in its analysis because the
alleged injury does stem from the USPTO's act of issuing the patent. However,
the Court is correct for the wrong reason. Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, an issued
patent is presumed to be valid despite whether or not the USPTO was correct in
issuing it. 7 6 Further, the burden is shifted to the challenger (here the plaintiffs)
to prove that the patent or an individual claim within the patent is invalid.177 It
is not uncommon for the USPTO to issue invalid patents, whether it be for prior
art, public use, or obviousness, but the patent is still enforceable until proven
otherwise. Therefore, it would not matter whether the written policy is or is not
unconstitutional because the patent could have been issued and the plaintiffs
172 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984).
17 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656
(1993) (holding that white contractors did have an injury because they lacked the ability to com-
pete, and that injury was fairly traceable to a program assisting minorities in the same industry);
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (hold-
ing increased litter in parks was fairly traceable to a freight rate increase causing prices to increase
for shipment of trash for recycling). But see Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., Inc., 426 U.S.
26 (1976) (holding that enforcement of charitable status for hospitals was not fairly traceable to
free medical care availability); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding potential builders'
and residents' future injury was not fairly traceable to zoning laws preventing building of low-
income housing).
174 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
17 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-
42).
176 "A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent ... shall be presumed valid inde-
pendently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be pre-
sumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim." 35 U.S.C § 282 (2006).
1" "The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party
asserting such invalidity." Id.
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would have the same alleged injury. Granted, the USPTO was more likely to
issue the patent because of the written policy, but the driving force is the pre-
sumption of validity. Since every patent issued is automatically valid and can
be enforced by the patent holder until a challenger can prove the patent invalid,
every person has a traceable injury to the USPTO. As mentioned before, this
injury is unlikely to be supported because it is a generalized grievance attacking
the foundations of the patent process.
d. Redressability
Redressibility is the last standing requirement set forth in Article III.
"[W]hen a plaintiffs standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is
whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to
himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."' 78 This standard
can be broken into two subsections: first, whether declaring the USPTO's acts
unconstitutional would provide the remedy sought, and second, whether it is
likely that the court will find in favor of the plaintiffs.
First, finding the USPTO policy unconstitutional would provide some
of the remedy sought. The court claims that if the USPTO's written policy was
found unconstitutional, then the issued patents under this policy would be defi-
nitionally invalid.'79 Again, assuming there is a First Amendment violation,
then the policy would be found unconstitutional, but this is not the entire relief
sought by the plaintiffs. To invalidate the gene patent claims, the plaintiffs
would still have to take the patent holders to court to have the claims invali-
dated. The plaintiffs have simultaneously done this action by joining Myriad in
a declaratory judgment action. Then, if the court declares the gene patent claims
invalid, the isolated unaffected and isolated mutated BRCAl/2 genes become
usable by the public. However, this only partially fulfills the plaintiffs' prayer
for relief. The plaintiffs also want the patent claims regarding methods using
the BRCAl/2 genes to be invalidated. Unfortunately, this would not occur by
declaring the written policy unconstitutional because methods are patentable
through other USPTO policies. Therefore, the plaintiffs can only receive a par-
tial remedy at most.
Moreover, the plaintiffs are unlikely to receive a favorable judgment in
order to remedy the injury. "[I]t must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'specul-
ative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' 80 Based on
the court's opinion, it must have assumed that the plaintiffs were likely to win.
Because this opinion strongly favors the plaintiffs, it is likely that the Court may
also favor the plaintiffs when it reviews the substantive issues of the case.
' Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
17 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
180 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
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Although the Supreme Court has not had many opportunities to clari-
fy,' 8' in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court held that patent protection extended
to "anything under the sun that is made by man."1 82 This left the door wide open
to gene patentability. The Federal Circuit has laid a clear foundation about the
validity of gene patents and touched on each of the requirements to obtain a
patent: utility, novelty, and obviousness. Regarding utility, In re Fisher estab-
lished that genes were patentable as long as the applicant could provide a "spe-
cific and substantial utility," practical utility, and its use would benefit the pub-
lic.' 83 Gene patents also satisfied the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102.
"If the holdings in In re Bergstrom are strictly followed, virtually any recombi-
nant protein should be deemed novel over its extracted counterpart, since invari-
ably obtained under a purer form ....
One of the more difficult hurdles in gene patentability is the obvious-
ness requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 103. "In re Bell and In re Deuel make clear
that prior art disclosures of genes that are similar to a newly discovered gene do
not render obvious the particular sequence of the newly discovered gene, even if
the methods of discovering [it] . . . are obvious." 185 Finally, the Federal Circuit
has even illustrated how the gene sequences should be characterized in the de-
scription claims for a gene patent.
Assuming the Federal Circuit is correct and gene patents can be valid,
then the district court should have seen the lines of precedent set by the Su-
preme Court regarding Copyright and First Amendment violations.187 For ex-
ample, the Copyright Act grants the author the exclusive rights to publish, copy,
181 "The Supreme Court has not recently considered the patentability of products derived from
nature. The Court had the opportunity to consider one such patent in In re Bergy, a companion
case to Chakrabarty. However, Bergy withdrew his application prior to the ruling, and the Court
dismissed the appeal as moot." Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591,
612-13 (2008) (citations omitted).
182 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 5 (1953); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)).
183 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1377 (found nucleic acid sequences encoding proteins for maize
plants unpatentable only because the applicant did not know what the proteins did and did not
benefit the public).
184 PHILIPPE G. DUCOR, PATENTING THE RECOMBINANT PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
OTHER MOLECULES 14 (Kluwer Law Int'l Ltd. 1998) (citing In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394
(C.C.P.A. 1970)).
185 Edward T. Lentz, Are Real Business People so Easily Thwarted, in PERSPECTVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 441, 443 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (citing In re Bell,
991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Deuel, 51 F. 3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
186 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) "An ade-
quate written description of a DNA . . . 'requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formu-
la, chemical name, or physical properties,' not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed
chemical invention. . . . '[W]hat is required is a description of the DNA itself."' Id. at 1566-67
(citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
187 Risch, supra note 181 ("For example, copyright law limits speech by barring the distribution
of copyrighted works, but arguments that such a bar is unconstitutional per se are unpersuasive.").
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and distribute the author's work starting from the time of creation;' 88 this com-
pletely stifles the freedom to impart information, but it is constitutional. Issued
patents are published online and can be printed, copied, distributed, and dis-
cussed. Moreover, the Copyright Act allows an identified author exclusive
rights to his work from the time of creation until seventy years after his death'89
and unidentified authors' works are protected for ninety-five years from publi-
cation or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first.190 If this exclusive
right is considered constitutional, then a mere twenty-year patent protection
period should be constitutional.
Lastly, the Supreme Court has recognized the dichotomy between the
First Amendment and the Intellectual Property Clause,' 9 ' and has held "[d]ue to
this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes in-
stantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication."' 9 2 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed this concept for patent law regarding ideas by hold-
ing, "[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and ab-
stract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work."l93 Lower courts have also created a strong
precedent distinguishing gene subject matter from these categories. Judge
Learned Hand opined in Parke-Davis long ago that a gene was not a product of
nature if it had been isolated and purified from its state of nature. 194 Further in
In re Myer' 95 and In re Grams,19 6 the Federal Circuit determined that DNA qual-
ified as patentable subject matter because it fell within the definition of "compo-
sition of matter" under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court should have con-
cluded that the plaintiffs would be unlikely to receive a favorable judgment to
remedy their injury.
The court should not have found standing. All three elements of consti-
tutional standing were not present. There was no definite, direct injury that
would not apply generally. Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not overcome the
generalized grievance limitations provided under prudential standing. Although
the injury may be traceable, the court should have determined that the plaintiffs
were unlikely to receive a favorable judgment because the Federal Circuit has
already found genes to be patentable and the Supreme Court has established that
188 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1985).
189 Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195-96 (2003).
190 Id. at 196.
19 Id. at 219.
192 Id. (referencing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
193 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (this concept was recently reaffirmed by the
Federal Circuit); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
194 See generally Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 109 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911)
(the patent on adrenaline was found valid because no one had purified it to that form before).
195 In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
196 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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the Intellectual Property Clause's exclusive rights do not violate the First
Amendment. Even if this precedent is ignored, the plaintiffs would still not
receive the relief sought. For these reasons, a court reviewing this decision,
should reverse the district court's standing conclusion.
Of course, alleged patent infringers are free to continue to challenge the
validity of DNA patents, even in the face of unlikely victory; perhaps the Feder-
al Circuit or the Supreme Court will reverse course. However, generalized
grievances that are unlikely to win under current law mean that the USPTO is
not the proper party to suit.
3. Dissecting the Consequences of the Court's Opinion
Due to the court's final decision, the lengths used to justify justiciability
in order to review this major issue will likely cause other intellectual property
problems. This section will provide a brief overview of procedural and policy
outcomes that could result from this decision.
The Supreme Court has stated:
The "standing" requirement serves other purposes. Because it
assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a
claim of injury in fact, a court may decide the case with some
confidence that its decision will not pave the way for lawsuits
which have some, but not all, of the facts of the case actually
decided by the court. 19 7
Unfortunately, the district court's opinion has set a precedent that will likely
open the floodgates to review any of the USPTO's policies that lead to an issued
patent. This decision seems to ignore the Supreme Court's stance declaring,
"'suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law,
but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations
... [are], even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations
of law, . . . rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication."" 98 Based
on the plaintiffs' reasoning, the written policy should be unconstitutional be-
cause it allows the USPTO to issue a patent and wrongly provide exclusive
rights to patent holders. When the patent holders enforce those exclusive rights,
then the plaintiffs lose their freedom of expression. If the court upholds this
analysis, then it would be easy for any party to invalidate any of the USPTO's
policies that allow a patent to be issued and provides the patent holder the abili-
ty to enforce exclusive rights.
19 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Arns. United for the Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
198 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 759-60 (1984)).
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There are strong policy reasons for permitting exclusive rights, despite
the fact that the plaintiffs may be discouraged to act. The Supreme Court has
held that the exclusive right provided by patent protection affords the incentive
to research and create ideas.199 Further, if that protection is not made available
then it is more likely for that incentive to diminish. If anything, the effect pro-
vided by patent protection is necessary to prevent others from usurping patent
protection and diminishing that incentive to propagate information.
Alternatively, if only the written policy granting the USPTO authority
to issue gene patents is found unconstitutional, then undiscovered genes and
gene testing will likely be hidden; this will prevent the free flow of information
as well as wasting time, energy, and resources as the plaintiffs and others at-
tempt to reinvent what one company may have already secretly discovered.
Particularly, the public will see an increase in trade secret use. 20 0 The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as "any information, including formu-
las, patterns, compilations, techniques, etc., that derive an actual or potential
economic value from not being generally known or ascertainable in the market
place . . . subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy." 20 For example, the
discovery of a new gene may not be protected by trade secret, but what it can be
used for and the results of its use may be hidden. Thus, elaborate gene testing
software or machines to treat new diseases will be monopolized by those who
can keep it a secret until the information becomes generally well known.
This scare of secrecy and stalling innovation has been acknowledged
before. The Framer's wanted to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for a limited time . . . exclusive Right[s]... ."202 Analyzing the
plain meaning acknowledges the fact that progress would be hindered if there
was no security for going public with discoveries. Similarly, issues regarding
decreased incentives arose during debates on expressed sequence tags (ESTs)
patents relating to pharmaceutical companies.203
Reid Adler, the director of NIH's Office of Technology Trans-
fer, countered critics by contending that patenting ESTs would
offer the protection needed to persuade drug makers to license
the inventions and develop new medicines. He said that if the
199 Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
200
Trade Secrets generally are state law rights recognizing that some inventions
are not suitable for patent or copyright protection, either because of the nature
of the invention or because the inventor may wish to avoid public disclosure
of the details so that it might extend the secrecy of the invention.
HUGH B. WELLONS ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 147 (2007).
201 Id. at 148.
202 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
203 See generally GARY ZWEIGER, TRANSDUCING THE GENOME: INFORMATION, ANARCHY, AND
REVOLUTION IN THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, 61-76 (2001).
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NIH put the sequences in the public domain and did not patent
them, then they would be rendered unpatentable and drug mak-
ers would have less of an incentive to work with them.204
The EST debates coincided with congressional acts during the 1980s "to ensure
that federally funded laboratory scientists and engineers supported technology
transfer and commercialization through patent protection and licensing."205 The
acts also were to "lead to commercial products that were previously unavailable,
and licensing revenue generated . .. [to] help fund further research."2 06
Over time, the Supreme Court has acknowledged patent protection and
its incentives. During the 1940s and 1950s, Justices Black and Douglas con-
trolled the power of patents by narrowly reading claims in favor of permitting
others to enter the market to compete with the patent holder.207 It was not until
the 1970s when patent law was correlated with anti-trust law and trade secrets
usage causing the Supreme Court to reconsider the benefits of patent protec-
tion.208
Then again, some believe that leaving the USPTO in the case allows an
opportunity for the government to raise a defense to halt this debate once and
for all.209
B. Standing Up for Myriad
The requirements for declaratory judgment have become more lenient
over time; especially in the patent realm after the decision in Medlmmune, Inc.
v. Genetech, Inc.21 0 Nonetheless, this section critiques the district court's ruling
finding standing against Myriad.
1. The Declaratory Relief Mutation
Declaratory Judgment has been codified by Congress to allow a court to
hear a case of "actual controversy," declare "rights and other legal relations" for
204 Id at 64.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Gerald Sobel, Esq., Competition Policy in Patent Cases and Antitrust, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 23, 42-48 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
208 Id. at 48-56; See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977)
(the Supreme Court recognized the negative effects of "free riding" and held that a restriction on
competition was justified because it had a pro-competitive effect); Kewanne Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (observing that the patent system stimulates invention and
commercialization by providing a 17-year exclusive right to the inventor).
209 See generally Kevin E. Noonan, BRCA Patent Suit to Continue in Southern District of New
York, PATENT Docs: BIOTECH & PHARMA PATENT LAW & NEWS BLOG (Nov. 2, 2009),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/1 1/patent-suit-to-continue-in-southem-district-of-new-york.html.
210 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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parties who bring this action, declare a final judgment on the action, and permit
further relief based on the judgment if necessary.21 1 Prior to the MedImmune
holding, the federal courts had consistently used a two prong analysis to find
standing in a declaratory judgment action.
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the
patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of
the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit,
and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or
212
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity.
However, in MedImmune the Supreme Court altered the "reasonable apprehen-
sion" prong and replaced it with a more lenient standard called the "all the cir-
cumstances" test.213 By applying recent court interpretations of MedImmune,
the court determined the new test to include an evaluation of affirmative acts by
the defendants and meaningful preparation by the plaintiffs.2 14 Although this
standard has opened up declaratory judgment actions in patent law, other recent
authority has distinguished MedImmune, rebutting the court's conclusions.
a. Actual Controversy
There is no actual controversy between most of these plaintiffs and
these defendants. For an actual controversy to exist under the Article III, there
must be "a real and substantial dispute affecting the legal rights and obligations
of parties having adverse interests.,,2 15 Not all of the plaintiffs have a real and
substantial dispute. For example, ACMG, ASCP, and CAP did not infringe, did
not receive cease-and-desist letters and were not contacted by Myriad in order to
expect to have a real and substantial dispute. 1 None of the breast cancer vic-
tims and most of the named doctors have not infringed directly or secondarily,
did not receive cease-and-desist letters, and were not contacted by Myriad to
expect to have a real and substantial dispute.217 The only plaintiffs who have
received cease-and-desist letters were Dr. Kazazian and Dr. Ostrer. The others
211 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006).
212 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
213 Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 127.
214 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
215 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d. 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983); See also 60 AM. JUR. 2D.
PATENTS § 870 (2010) ("[A]ctual controversy exists only when the plaintiff has been threatened
with an infringement suit, charged with infringement, inducement of infringrment, or contributory
infringement; the plaintiff has actually produced the infringing article, or has immediate intention
and ability to do so . . . ").
216 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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who were contacted by Myriad are not named as plaintiffs in this action. Thus,
the only possible parties who could move forward would be Dr. Kazazian and
Dr. Ostrer because the cease-and-desist letters create an actual controversy.
Alternatively, all the other plaintiffs have adverse interests because all of them
want the patent invalidated, but is that interest enough to establish an actual
controversy?
In the patent realm, typically the actual controversy is found when the
parties are adverse, such as using declaratory judgment as a defense during an
infringement suit2 18 or for licensees who will be sued for infringement as for its
present or future failure to pay royalties. 2 19 Further, the Supreme Court has held
that real and substantial controversies shall be "distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." 220 Myriad
has not brought suit against the plaintiffs for infringement which would allow
the plaintiffs to use declaratory action as a defense.2 2 1 What the court consi-
dered were alleged facts describing a potential infringement that results in a
hypothetical situation attempting to cross the judicial threshold. Regrettably,
the court seemed to be looking forward to applying MedImmune rather than
applying Article III of the Constitution.
There seems to be no actual controversy between most of the plaintiffs
and Myriad. However, in 2007, MedImmune created a significant change to the
standing requirements for declaratory judgments, especially for patent cases,
which overshadowed the Article III issues for declaratory judgment. "[T]he
question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy, between the parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment."222 The court analyzed this test based on guidelines set
forth by the Federal Circuit establishing a two part test which evaluated the af-
firmative acts of the defendants and the meaningful preparations of the plain-
tiffs. 223
b. Affirmative Acts
The acts taken by Myriad are not enough to find standing. The first test
is the affirmative acts test. The Federal Circuit interpreted the MedImmune
case: "Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position
that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of either pursuing
218 Hofstadter v. Ruderman, 118 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y 1953).
219 See generally MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
220 Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
221 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
378-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
222 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127.
223 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365.
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arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do." 224
Despite the court's statement that it follows Federal Circuit guidelines, it loosely
cites a handful of Federal Circuit authorities and it justifies a low standard by its
own previous interpretations and a few surrounding district courts having less
influence on the matter.225 Had the court strictly applied the Federal Circuit
guidelines,226 it should have found the following.
First, Myriad did not take affirmative acts toward most of these plain-
tiffs. In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that
declaratory judgment "will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns of
the existence of a patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to
pose a risk of infringement, without some affirmative act by the patentee." 227
Out of several associations of researchers, eight doctors, and six breast cancer
patients, only Dr. Kazazian and Dr. Ostrer received affirmative acts from My-
riad. At most, the rest of the plaintiffs only can perceive that Myriad's patent
will pose a risk of infringement.
Conversely, the Federal Circuit has also held that not only will the court
look at prior litigation between the parties, but also the "behavioral observa-
tions" of "an aggressive litigation strategy." 2 28 To begin, no prior litigation be-
tween Myriad and any of the named plaintiffs occurred. However, "[pirior liti-
gious conduct is one circumstance to be considered in assessing whether the
totality of circumstances creates an actual controversy."229 Myriad has filed two
infringement complaints against non-plaintiffs, but Oncormed and Myriad set-
tled, and Myriad dropped the suit against the University of Pennsylvania when it
stopped infringing.23 0 Additionally, "substantial controversy has also been
found where patentees made direct accusations of infringement or demanded
licensing fees." 2 3 1 Myriad had sent cease-and-desist letters to Dr. Kazazian, Dr.
Ostrer, the University of Pennsylvania, and YDL and two of the letters offered
licenses. Looking at "all of the circumstances" it could seem that Myriad took
affirmative acts sufficient to support declaratory judgment with respect to those
224 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
225 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88.
226 See infra Part Ill.B.2.
227 480 F.3d at 1380-81.
228 Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
229 Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (but held that
one prior suit concerning different products and different patents should be given minimal
weight).
230 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
231 Geospan Corp. v. Pictometry Int'l Corp., 598 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971 (D. Minn. 2008) (pa-
raphrasing SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1382) (but Geospan found no declaratory judgment because the
two letters sent to Geospan were only for information gathering purposes for potential infringe-
ment, which does not create an adverse interest).
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parties. But, it also seems that these acts do not support a showing of "an ag-
gressive litigation strategy" with respect to all the other parties.
c. Meaningful Preparation
"[T]he 'meaningful preparation' inquiry properly focuses on whether
the Plaintiffs are meaningfully prepared to engage in the infringing act such that
the court's decision would serve as more than an 'advisory opinion."' 232 For
example, MedImmune was already producing the patented product as a licensee
and that license was the only thing shielding the company from an infringement
suit.2 33 The only step away from infringement it had was by failing to pay its
royalties.234
The plaintiffs' key showing is that they are "ready, willing, and able" to
use the patented product if the patent is invalidated.2 35 Similarly, the same terms
have been used for declaratory actions in antitrust law for those who knowingly
enforce invalid patents to maintain a monopoly.236 The terms have come to
mean that the plaintiffs must establish that a desire to enter the relevant market,
the ability to enter the market, and but for the fear of infringement would have
entered the market.237 It is possible to establish the desire to enter and the cau-
sation elements for each of the plaintiffs, but it is difficult to ascertain the ability
of the plaintiffs to do so. For example, the researcher plaintiffs all say that they
are ready, willing, and able, but do not discuss any further how the researchers
are actually able. The court assumes they meet the ability requirement because
they have the equipment and expertise to begin.2 38 This assumption would defi-
nitely ring true for Dr. Kazazian, Dr. Ganguly, and Dr. Ostrer who had all per-
formed the work prior to receiving cease-and-desist orders. Even the court
could reasonably assume this ability, "to allow such a scant showing to provoke
a declaratory judgment suit would be to allow nearly anyone who so desired to
challenge a patent."2 39
Nevertheless, the rest of the plaintiffs do not seem "able" to enter the
market at all, and therefore, should not have standing to support a declaratory
judgment action. Both the Breast Cancer Action group and the Boston Wom-
en's Health Book Collective assert that they are ready, willing, and able to pro-
232 Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (citing Cat Tech LLC v. TubMaster,
Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
233 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121-25 (2007).
234 Id.
235 Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
236 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anitcompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN.
L. REv. 101, 167 (Nov. 2006).
237 Id. at 167-70.
238 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
239 Benitec Austi., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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vide information and data.2 4 0 These organizations do not have the equipment or
the expertise to actually extract BRCAl/2 genes and perform the patented me-
thods because these are not the activities in which these organizations engage.
Further, it is understandable to put a face with the disease, but the breast cancer
patients should not qualify for standing. They have the desire to use the market
not to enter it and, but-for the risk of infringement, are unable to seek testing
more convenient for them because others cannot enter the market. Moreover,
the breast cancer patients, as far as alleged in the complaint, do not have the
equipment or expertise to achieve the ability to use and perform the patented
products and methods. For these reasons, at least some of the plaintiffs should
have been dropped for lack of standing.
In summary, most of the plaintiffs do not achieve standing for a declara-
tory judgment action. First, there is no actual controversy as defined by Article
III because the parties who did not receive cease-and-desist letters do not have a
real or substantial suit. Even though MedImmune applies a more lenient stan-
dard, under the totality of the circumstances most of the plaintiffs would not
have satisfied the elements to obtain standing. Either there were no acts taken
directly to the plaintiffs or the affirmative acts may not be enough to show an
aggressive pattern of litigation. Finally, at least the non-researcher plaintiffs are
not meaningfully prepared to use the patented product in a way that would in-
fringe. The court should have reached a different outcome. Therefore, any re-
viewing court should reverse this decision.
2. Procedural and Patent Policy
The district court's analysis of the standing requirements for declaratory
judgment action may lead to procedural and patent law issues in the future.
With this precedent, potential infringers have a greater opportunity to challenge
patent validity. Moreover, shifting the power to the potential infringers will
reduce the incentives for patent holders and will cause changes in intellectual
property as well as technological advancement benefits to the public.
241In MedImmune, the Supreme Court began its standing discussion by
reviewing criminal precedent and upheld that no one should have to carry out a
criminal act before having the opportunity to challenge the validity of the law.242
By reviewing criminal violations, the Supreme Court exhibited the severity of
the consequences needed to obtain standing. Additionally, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the plaintiffs should not have to "bet the farm" or lose every-
thing they have, which also illustrates the severity of the consequences to be
shown by the licensee.243 Nevertheless, interpretations by the district court al-
240 See Complaint, supra note 43.
241 MedImHune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 127 (2007).
242 Id. at 129.
243 Id
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lows it to open its courtroom doors to almost anyone who may be unhappy with
the exclusive rights of any patent holder whether or not there really is a contro-
versy. This is not the result the Supreme Court intended.
To obtain declaratory judgment following the court's opinion, any per-
son would have to allege that they are ready, willing, and able, and that some
affirmative action was previously taken by the patent holder against anyone at
some point, even in the distant past. Thus, any challenger of any patent holder
can allege a First Amendment violation, meet these standing requirements, and
attempt to invalidate any patent. This precedent extinguishes the exclusive
rights granted by the Intellectual Property Clause if a patent holder acts to use
those rights.
This change in power removes the incentives provided by the Intellec-
tual Property Clause. Historically, patent incentives have enhanced research
activity. Patents "have fostered research by providing a niche of exclusivity by
forcing would-be copyists to invent around or to pursue alternative avenues of
research."2 " Thus, researchers may stumble upon an even better method or
discovery because they had to come up with a way to avoid infringement. Addi-
tionally, discoveries are produced more quickly. Researchers and inventors
want to be the first to file at the patent office in order to evade a rejection by
others who beat the applicant to it. In addition, the public receives high-end
medical technologies and better quality inventions because companies are will-
ing to spend more money in order to see a guaranteed return on their investment
during their limited hold on the invention. As discussed earlier, patents require
information to be disclosed to the public in return for the incentive of limited
exclusivity preventing what may otherwise be kept as trade secrets.245 These
incentives and benefits will be diminished if the availability of patent challenges
continues to increase because patent holders will not want the hassles and costs
of litigation or the risk of patent invalidation to interfere with their investment.
IV. IF YOU CAN'T CREATE ... LEGISLATE
Legislation is the most appropriate method for the plaintiffs to achieve a
legitimate pronouncement that gene patents are valid and that the USPTO writ-
ten policy should be enforced. In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court declared that
genetic research "should be addressed to the political branches of the Govern-
ment, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts."2 46 Unlike the right
to a speedy trial where complex subject such as biotechnology may not receive
the scrutiny it deserves, the slow and deliberative nature of the legislative
process was intended by our forefathers to prevent irrational change and upset
of the status quo. It has been found that district court judges improperly con-
244 Lentz, supra note 185, at 442.
245 See supra Part III.A.3.
246 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
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strue patent claims in thirty-three percent of the cases appealed to federal court;
this should be compared with the less than ten percent reversal rate on all other
criminal and civil cases.247 Congress is more likely to have experience on bio-
technology matters than the judicial system because Congress has the opportuni-
ty to call in experts, listen to public testimony, and order the Secretary of Com-
merce to engage in thorough research and report back to Congress about the
necessity and economic impact of gene patents. It is difficult for the judicial
branch to ascertain the same level of expertise in such a short period of time and
with limited resources.
Furthermore, the Intellectual Property Clause "empowers Congress to
determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's judg-
ment, will serve the ends of the Clause."248 Thus, Congress is the more appro-
priate venue for a system-wide change regarding gene patents. Corresponding-
ly, the European Union (EU) and the European Patent Convention (EPC) have
implemented restrictive patentability standards involving biotechnology. For
example, simple discoveries of a sequence or partial sequence of a gene and
some methods used to treat the human body are not patentable subject matter.2 49
Although isolated forms of the sequence or partial sequence of a gene is still
patentable in the EU, patent protection can still be refused based on a determina-
tion of morality.2 50 Specifically, the policy prohibits inventions contradictory to
public morality from patent protection.25'
Likewise, the plaintiffs could have gone through Congress to encourage
restrictions on patentable subject matter. It appears that the plaintiffs already
have a strong foundation for lobbying efforts. For example, the ACLU, Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA), March of Dimes, and other organizations that
are very influential in Congress support the invalidation of gene patenting.2 52
Further, the plaintiffs could rally support from medical professionals and breast
cancer patients to contact their local representatives on the issue. For example,
in the early 1980s, Congress adopted two acts limiting the scope of some medi-
cal technology. 253 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 "enables the government to seize
control over certain patents if health care is thought to be impeded by either the
actions or inaction of those holding rights to patents."254 Furthermore, the
247 See Kimberly Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Handle Patent Law Cases? 15
HARV. J. L. & TECH. I (Fall 2001).
248 Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (emphasis added).
249 Paradise, supra note 55, at 140.
250 Id. at 140-41.
251 Id
252 See Daniel B. Ravicher, AMA, March of Dimes and Others Support PUBPAT/ACLU chal-
lenges to breast cancer genes: Briefs Filed in Support of PUBPAT/ACLU Motion to Declare
Patents Unconstitutional, PUB. PATENT FOUND.: REPRESENTING THE PUB.'S INTEREST IN THE
PATENT SYs. (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.pubpat.org/brcaSJfiled.htm.
253 See generally Zweiger, supra note 203, at 61-76.
254 Id at 67.
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Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984 "enables patent infringement litigation to be halted
while drug products are in clinical trials."2 5 5
On the contrary, gene patent invalidation may not be what the general
public wants and this view can be reflected by Congress's inaction. The United
States government has yet to use the rights established through the 1980s Acts,
which implies an overarching statement that "business and patent issues will not
stand in the way of new medicine." 2 56 Moreover, on February 9, 2007, Repre-
sentative Xavier Becerra introduced H.R. 977, the Genomic Research and Ac-
cessibility Act.2 57 If it had been enacted, this legislation would have prohibited
genes from being patented. 2 5 8 Nevertheless, H.R. 977 died at the end of the
110th Congressional Session awaiting action in the House Judiciary Committee
and has yet to be reintroduced during the 111th Congressional Session.2 59 More
recently, four representatives from both sides of the aisle sent a letter to the en-
tire House leadership urging it to acknowledge the importance of patent protec-
tion during economic hardship because patents increase job growth and support
American businesses.260
Despite the current hesitation, using the legislative branch is the most
appropriate venue for the plaintiffs. Congressional action will provide a clear
determination for both the USPTO, researchers, patent holders, and the public as
to whether gene patents are or are not valid.
V. CONCLUSION
This one district court opinion has caused an analysis covering the inter-
relation of patent law, constitutional law, administrative law, federal courts law,
First Amendment law, intellectual property law, and the legislative process. In
summary, the patentability of the BRCAl/2 gene can either cause the law to
stand firm or to alter and expand the laws as we know them to be. Any appel-
late court should be able to perform this analysis and determine that the district
court misunderstood standing.
The district court should not have found standing to support a First
Amendment action against the USPTO. The court wrongfully applied the re-
viewability standards to support an injury. Due to that analysis, the plaintiffs
were unable to establish a direct and definite injury. Further, the plaintiffs gene-
ralized grievance could not meet the prudential limitations in order to qualify as
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See H.R. 977: Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, GOvTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-977 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 See Donald Zuhn, New False Marking Bill Introduced in the House, PATENT Docs: BIOTECH
& PHARMA PATENT L. & NEWS BLoG (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.patentdocs.org/patent-legislation/.
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an injury. This generalized grievance also caused a false positive of the tracea-
bility standard. Finally, the plaintiffs would not be able to meet a full remedy
because they are unlikely to receive a favorable judgment. Consequently, this
decision has the ability to majorly affect gene patents because researchers will
lose the incentive to patent and revert to using trade secrets. The increase in
trade secret use will result in higher informational and fiscal costs to the general
public.
The court should not have found standing to support a declaratory
judgment action against Myriad as to all the plaintiffs, and maybe not as to any
of them. The court failed to acknowledge the constitutional requirement of an
actual controversy. Therefore, the court did not dismiss the complaint for lack
of adversity. Furthermore, the court did not properly interpret the MedImmune
standard, which has led to broadening of the patent challenger's ability to inva-
lidate a patent. Subsequently, the court's decision has the potential to diminish
the incentives for all patents.
Finally, Congress has the power to limit patentable subject matter. The
plaintiffs seem to have a strong lobbying foundation and their efforts to make a
system-wide change may have been more fruitful by urging congressional ac-
tion against the patentability of biotechnology. For these reasons, any reviewing
court should reverse the district court's decision.
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